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Summary
Differential privacy is a rigorous mathematical framework for evaluating and pro-
tecting data privacy. In most existing studies, there is a vulnerable assumption that
records in a dataset are independent when differential privacy is applied. However,
in real-world datasets, records are likely to be correlated, which may lead to unex-
pected data leakage. In this survey, we investigate the issue of privacy loss due to
data correlation under differential privacy models. Roughly, we classify existing lit-
erature into three lines: 1) using parameters to describe data correlation in differential
privacy, 2) using models to describe data correlation in differential privacy, and 3)
describing data correlation based on the framework of Pufferfish. Firstly, a detailed
example is given to illustrate the issue of privacy leakage on correlated data in real
scenes. Then our main work is to analyze and compare these methods, and evalu-
ate situations that these diverse studies are applied. Finally, we propose some future
challenges on correlated differential privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the relationship between human and data has never been so inseparable.Meanwhile, the era of big data poses
new challenges to human data management, especially in data privacy1. Privacy preserving data releasing has been adopted by
academia and industry to protect individual privacy when datasets are are published to the public2,3. In order to guarantee data
security, data need to be sanitized via privacymechanisms, such as k-anoymity4, l-diversity5, t-closeness6. Among these privacy
mechanisms, differential privacy is one of the most promising privacy models to protect data privacy. The notion of differential
privacy was firstly proposed by Dwork et al.7, which provides a rigorous mathematical framework of defining and protecting
privacy. A common method to achieve differential privacy is to add random noise to the output of a query. It ensures that the
adversary cannot distinguish the participation of the individual even if the adversary knows the entire background information.
In traditional differential privacy, a weak assumption is that records in a dataset are independent from each other. In practice,
however, data in a dataset are usually correlated resulting from the process of data generation. As such, deleting one record
will have impacts on other records. Such impacts may reveal more information for the adversary. Kifer et al. confirms that the
correlation between data may disclose more information than expected8. This finding starts a new topic on how to preserve the
privacy of correlated datasets when they are released to the public. Adding noise to correlated datasets has been proposed as one
of methods to guarantee differential privacy. One of the challenges is how to add appropriate noise to preserve data privacy in
correlated datasets since adding too much noise to the correlated dataset will degrade data utility, and adding insufficient noise
will disclose data privacy.
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Generally, the amount of noise added to correlated datasets depends the extent of data correlation, which is an inherent feature
from data generation. In order to add appropriate noise, data generation or data correlation should be known by the curator
or the adversary as background information. Hence, many works modify traditional definition of differential privacy, and add
background knowledge of data correlation by correlation parameters and correlation models, to cope with the issue of privacy
loss for the correlated dataset. Pufferfish9 is a flexible privacy model without the assumption that data are independent in a
dataset, which can be used to quantify the privacy loss due to data correlation.
In terms of how to describe data correlation, we classify existing research into three streams. The first stream uses parameters
to describe simple data correlation in differential privacy. Chen. et al used the method of multiplying original sensitivity with the
number of correlated records, yet it may lead to too much noise10. Other correlation parameters are proposed to describe data
correlation in differential privacy, including the correlated degreematrix11 and the dependence coefficient12. The second stream
exploits correlation models to describe complex data correlation in differential privacy, such as Gaussian correlation model13,14
and Markov chain model15,16. The last stream is built on the privacy framework, called Pufferfish9, which is a flexible privacy
model to guarantee the data sharing needs and is able to describe simple and complex data correlations. Inspired by Pufferfish,
He et al. proposed another privacy model, Blowfish to tune privacy-utility trade-off17.
1.1 Outline and Survey Overview
Several surveys have been working on differential privacy. The first survey by Dwork7 summarized notions of differential pri-
vacy, mechanisms and some differentially private algorithms for data publishing. Later, Dwork et al. gave an overview on
motivated applications and future directions for data publishing and data analysis18,19. A book by Dwork presented comprehen-
sive coverage of algorithmsmaintaining differential privacy against adversaries and differentially privatemethods formechanism
design and machine learning20. Sarwate et al. studied differentially private algorithms for continuous data in signal process-
ing21. Recently, Zhu et al. gave a summary on the data publishing and data analysis underlying differential privacy22. Previous
surveys mainly focus on the concepts, theories and development of differential privacy. Different from existing works, this sur-
vey focuses on the issue of privacy leakage on correlated data, which is a vital issue in differential privacy. The contributions of
this paper are listed as below.
• First, we give a summary of existing research on correlated differential privacy, and roughly classify existing research
into three research streams: correlation parameters, correlation models and Pufferfish. This helps to understand the
characteristics of existing methods on correlated differential privacy.
• Second, we compare the advantages and disadvantages, similarities and differences and the application scenarios of
methods. This provides a guideline to use correlated differential methods in different scenarios.
• Finally, we propose a number of future topics on correlated differential privacy. This gives some sights on new issues and
potential methods in correlated differential privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the preliminaries in Section II, and gives examples to illustrate the
problem in Section III. Section IV and Section V summarize the studies in differential privacy models by correlation parameters
and correlation models, respectively. In Section VI, we introduce the framework of Pufferfish. Section VII is the future direction,
and finally, Section VIII is the conclusion.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Differential privacy
Differential privacy is a rigorous privacy model which is widely studied in the last decade. In brief,퐷 is a dataset that contains
a set of records. Two datasets 퐷 and 퐷
′
are referred to as neighboring datasets when they differ in one record. A query 푓 is a
function that maps records 푟 ∈ Ω to abstract outputs 푓 (퐷) ∈ Ω, where Ω is the whole set of outputs. Hence, the dataset is the
input and the released information from the mechanism is the output. The relationship can be described as 푓 : 퐷 ←→ Ω.
Definition 1. (휖-Differential privacy)7 Given neighboring datasets퐷 and퐷
′
, a randomized algorithm satisfies 휖-differential
privacy for any possible outcome 푓 (퐷) ∈ Ω,
푃푟[(퐷) ∈ Ω] ≤ 푒푥푝(휖) ⋅ 푃푟[(퐷
′
) ∈ Ω] (1)
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where 휖 is privacy budget which determines privacy level. The lower 휖 represents the higher privacy level.
Definition 2. (Sensitivity).7 For a query 푓 ∶ 퐷 ←→ Ω, and neighboring datasets, the sensitivity of 푓 is defined as
Δ푓 = max
퐷,퐷
′
||푓 (퐷) − 푓 (퐷′ )||1 (2)
Sensitivity measures the maximal difference between neighboring datasets. When a dataset is given, sensitivity depends on the
type of query 푓 .
2.2 Differential Mechanisms
Two common mechanisms are widely used to achieve 휖-differential privacy: Laplace mechanism7 and Exponential mecha-
nism23.
Definition 3. (Laplace mechanism). Given a query 푓 :퐷 ←→ Ω over the dataset 퐷, Laplace mechanism satisfies 휖-differential
privacy if,
(퐷) = 푄(퐷) + 퐿푎푝푙푎푐푒(Δ∕휖) (3)
where 퐿푎푝푙푎푐푒(⋅) denotes Laplace noise which is drawn from a Laplace distribution with the probability density function
푝(푥|휆) = 1
2휆
푒−|푥|∕휆, where 휆 depends on privacy budget and sensitivity.
Definition 4. (Exponential mechanism). Given a score function 푆(퐷,휙) of a dataset 퐷, exponential mechanism satisfies
휖-differential privacy if
(퐷) =
(
푟푒푡푢푟푛 휙 ∝ 푒푥푝(
휖푆(퐷,휙)
2Δ푓
)
)
(4)
Differential privacy exploits the exponential mechanism to randomize the outputs, and a score function 푆(퐷,휙) is used to
evaluate the quality of an output 휙 for a query 푓 .
2.3 An analysis of data correlation
In this section, we will introduce somemost frequent studied correlations in the literature. Many types of correlations are in real-
world datasets, and the correlation is assumed to be known by the curator and the strong adversary. Generally, data correlation
can exist in one dataset or in multiple datasets. In the first case, data correlation can disclose more information when the dataset
is published from one entity. In the second case, personal information may appear in different entities. For instance, people
would like to share their information in different social applications (e.g., Twitter or Facebook), and these information can be
shared to the third party via social applications at the same time.
2.3.1 Direct correlation
Direct correlation occurs when the curator has access to all knowledge of data correlation. For example, 퐴,퐵, 퐶 are records in
a dataset, and direct correlation between these records can be expressed as 퐴 + 퐵 = 퐶 or 퐴 ∗ 퐵 = 퐶 , etc. Direct correlation is
deterministic; hence, it is relatively easy for the curator to handle. Direct correlation is simple data correlation.
2.3.2 Indirect correlation
Different from the direct correlation, indirect correlation is more complex. It is non-deterministic and thus can not defined the
correlation as a formula. Indirect correlation is complex data correlation.
Temporal correlation
A dataset with temporal correlation is generated by the predefinition of a time interval, and continuous released records falling
into this time interval are regarded as correlated by time. Continuous generated data in the real world tend to be temporally
correlated, like the dataset of user locations described in the example above. One characteristic of temporal correlation is that
all records are usually correlated, which means the first record in the dataset may have an impact on the last record. The extreme
case described in Section III is an example of such a case. And because all records in the temporally-correlated dataset are
related, some studies have solely focused on differential privacy given temporal correlation16,15.
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Attribute correlation
Attribute correlation refers to correlations that can be revealed through a particular attribute, i.e., when the value of two or more
records is the same or similar. In reality, there are many attributes that can create correlations in real-world datasets, and many
real-world datasets contain those attributes. For example, addresses, which are common to social network and ancestry datasets,
are an attribute that can be used to identify members of the same family.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we show the issue of privacy loss due to data correlation. Most previous works assume that all records in the
dataset are independent. Based on this assumption, differential privacy claims that it can limit the probabilistic inference when
the attacker knows the whole information but one record. However, records in a real-world dataset are often correlated with each
other, and it is likely to breach the privacy in a dataset when the adversary knows all but one record and the knowledge of data
correlation. Here, we give an example to illustrate the temporal correlation in a dataset, and how data correlation will degrade
privacy level.
4 AN EXAMPLE TO ILLUSTRATE DATA CORRELATION
Considering the scenario of a traffic monitoring application, data of user mobility are collected by a trusted server continuously.
In this scenario, one typical correlated dataset is generated - temporal correlated dataset. This type of dataset is generated
continuously in a time interval, and released records are correlated due to time correlation. Users in a monitoring area are likely
to have social relationships - perhaps friends or couples. Due to social relationships, location information is the same for some
users during a period of time, and thus users’ location information have some correlation in a dataset.
TABLE 1 Users’ locations at different time points
user
t
1 2 3 4
푢1 푙표푐2 푙표푐2 푙표푐3 푙표푐4
푢2 푙표푐2 푙표푐2 푙표푐3 푙표푐4
푢3 푙표푐1 푙표푐4 푙표푐5 푙표푐2
푢4 푙표푐4 푙표푐5 푙표푐2 푙표푐5
TABLE 2 Sum counts of users’ locations
loc
t
1 2 3 4
푙표푐1 1 0 0 0
푙표푐2 2 2 1 1
푙표푐3 0 0 2 0
푙표푐4 1 1 0 2
푙표푐5 0 1 1 1
As shown in the Table I, users’ location are given in different time points. In Table 1, we can note that 푢푠푒푟1 and 푢푠푒푟2 have
the same location from the time point 푡 = 1 to 푡 = 4. The reason could be 푢푠푒푟1 and 푢푠푒푟2 are family members, they are likely
to have the same track in a time period. In this case, changing the location of 푢푠푒푟1 will also change the location of 푢푠푒푟2, hence
the records of 푢푠푒푟1 and 푢푠푒푟2 are referred to as correlated records.
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Table II shows the sum of true counts with regard to user locations. When Laplace mechanism is applied in this case, the
amount of Lap(1/휖) noise is added to perturb each count in Table II so that released information can achieve 휖-DP at each time
point. However, if the attacker knows the relationship between 푢푠푒푟1 and 푢푠푒푟2, the attacker can infer the location of 푢푠푒푟1 and
푢푠푒푟2. As a result, when the count of users location is released, the privacy of users location is unlikely to satisfy 휖-differential
privacy because the same count is considered to be released two times. Lap(2/휖) noise should be added to the query result in
order to hold differential privacy in the dataset.
Based on the example above, we can find that data correlation can exist in a dataset. The change of one record can have an
impact on other records, and it also leads to changes on the query response. This example proves that correlated data in a dataset
will leak more information to the adversary when using differential privacy, and hence degrade the privacy level. Intuitively,
one method is to inject more noise to the correlated dataset. The amount of noise added to the correlated dataset depends on the
degree of correlated information in a dataset. This situation reveals that the level of challenge faced in dealing with the trade-off
between data utility and data privacy.
5 CORRELATION PARAMETERS IN DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we will introduce some works that use correlation parameters to describe data correlation on correlated datasets
in differential privacy. After data correlation is measured by correlation parameters, an appropriate amount of noise can be
quantified to add in differential privacy, and thus privacy can be guaranteed with a desirable trade-off between data privacy and
data utility.
5.1 The number of correlated records
One of the simple method to describe data correlation was proposed by Chen et al.24. The correlation parameter 푘 is used to
measure the extent of correlated data. A dataset퐷 with a correlation parameter 푘means that the maximum number of correlated
records in the dataset is 푘. The correlation parameter 푘 is assumed to be known by the curator or the strong adversary. After
multiplying the original sensitivity with the number of 푘 correlated records, any
휖
푘
differentially private mechanism also satisfies
휖 differential privacy when the number of 푘 correlated records are in the dataset.
Analysis: The advantage of this method is the simplicity and easy to implement. However, when a batch of correlated records
are in a dataset, a large amount of noise will be added in the output since the correlated parameter 푘 cannot describe data
correlation accurately. Hence, this will lead to a severe degradation in dataset utility.
5.2 Dependence coefficient
Liu et al. studied data correlation with a new definition of dependent differential privacy, which considers more background
knowledge of data correlation described by a correlation parameter 휌푖푗 , called the dependence coefficient
12. Firstly, the definition
of dependent differential privacy (DDP) is given below.
Definition 5. (휖-Dependent Differential Privacy) A mechanism  gives 휖-dependent differential privacy for any pairs of
dependent neighboring datasets 퐷(퐿,푅) and 퐷′(퐿,푅) and any possible outcomes Ω, if the mechanism satisfies
max
퐷(퐿.푅),퐷′(퐿,푅)
푃 ((퐷(퐿,푅) = Ω))
푃 ((퐷′(퐿,푅) = Ω))
≤ 푒푥푝(휖) (5)
where 퐿 is the number of correlated records and 푅 is the probabilistic dependence relationship between the records.
In the definition of 휖-dependent differential privacy, we note two differences from the traditional differential privacy. One is
the probabilistic dependence relationship is specified in the dataset and the other is the size of correlated records is specified
in the dataset. From the definition of DDP, we see that the DDP can guarantee the data privacy and defend against the attacker
who even has the background information of probabilistic dependence푅 between records. More specific, dependent sensitivity
includes two parts: the sensitivity caused by the modification of the record itself △퐷푗 and the sensitivity induced in other
records 휌푖푗△퐷푖푗 . The dependence coefficient 휌푖푗 ∈ [0, 1] serves as a metric to evaluate the extent of the dependent relationship
between tuples.
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Definition 6. (Dependent sensitivity) For a query푄, dependent sensitivity is defined over a dependent dataset 퐷 as,
퐷푆푄 = max
푖
퐶푖퐿∑
푗=퐶푖1
휌푖푗Δ푄푗 (6)
where 퐶푖1,...,퐶푖퐿 denotes 퐿 records that are dependent with 푖-th record and 휌푖푖 = 1. 퐷푆
푄 denotes dependent sensitivity of a
query푄 over all records in the dataset 퐷 caused by the modification of one individual record퐷푖.
Analysis: The advantage of dependence coefficient or DDP is that this correlation parameter is able to measure the degree of
data correlation. While the effectiveness of dependence coefficient depends on how well the correlation between records can be
described and computed. For example, when the correlation in a dataset is exactly known by the curator, this method can model
it well. When data correlation is unknown or partial known, the accuracy of dependence coefficient may be overestimated or
underestimated.
5.3 Zhao-Dependent Differential Privacy
Another kind of dependent differential privacy studied in25, which we refer to as Zhao-DDP in this paper. The goal of Zhao-
DDP is to prevent the adversary from inferring the user’s information with the combination of correlated records and query
responses. The definition of Zhao-DDP is given below.
Definition 7. (Zhao-휖-Dependent Differential Privacy) A mechanism provides 휖-DDP, if for any neighbouring datasets and
any possible outputs Ω, we have
ℙ[(푥푖, 푥퐾 , 푋퐾 ) ∈ Ω]
ℙ[(푥′
푖
, 푥퐾 , 푋퐾 ) ∈ Ω]
≤ 푒휖푐 , ∀푖, 퐾, 푥푖, 푥
′푖, 푥퐾 ,Ω (7)
where 푖 ∈ {1, ..., 푛}, 퐾 ⊆ [푖] = {1, ..., 푛}∖{푖}, 퐾 = [푖]∖퐾; 휖′ is a segmented linear function of traditional 휖-differential privacy.
When calculating the conditional probabilities, the correlation knowledge is needed from the curator. Comparing with differ-
ential privacy, we can find that K iterates through all subsets of [푖] = 1, ..., 푛∖{푖} to bound
ℙ[(푥푖 ,푥퐾 ,푋퐾 )∈Ω]
ℙ[(푥′
푖
,푥퐾 ,푋퐾 )∈Ω]
, while 휖-DP bounds
ℙ[(푥푖,푥[푖])∈Ω]
ℙ[(푥′
푖
,푥[푖])∈Ω]
.
Analysis:Comparingwith the DDP in12, Zhao-DDP considers more correlation informationℙ[푋{1,...,푛}∖{푋퐾}|푋퐾 ], while DDP
considers the correlation information ℙ[푋{1,...,푛}∖{푖}|푋푖].
5.4 Correlated degree matrix
Zhu et al. used the correlation parameter, correlated degree matrix to describe data correlation11. In real-world datasets, the
extent of correlation between records is different. For example, some records are fully correlated, which means that these records
are same records. Some records are partially correlated, which means that changing one record has a probability to change other
related records.When the generation of data is not known by the curator or the data correlation is not easy to specify, it is efficient
to denote the relation between records with the method of Pearson correlation. With this method, the extent of the impact of a
record on another record can be quantified and it is defined as the correlated degree in11. With the notion of correlated degree,
correlated sensitivity is proposed and defined in the correlated dataset. The definition of correlated sensitivity is given below.
Definition 8. (Correlated sensitivity) Correlated sensitivity for a query푄 is defined as,
퐶푆푞 = max
푖∈푞
푛∑
푗=0
|훿푖푗|{‖(푄(퐷푗) −푄(퐷−푗)‖1 (8)
where퐷푗 and퐷−푗 are neighboring datasets that differ in record 푗; 푞 is a set of records; 휃푖푗 is correlated degree between record 푖
and record 푗. Correlated sensitivity describes the maximal impact on all records in the dataset due to the deletion of one record.
Then, the correlation between records can be expressed with the correlated degree and formed into a correlated degree matrix
to show all relationships between records.
Analysis: The advantage is that this method can be applied in many cases when there is no special data correlation known by
the curator. This is because Pearson correlation can indicate the extent to which records are linear correlated without any prior
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knowledge of data generation. However, Pearson correlation is a method to evaluate linear relationship between records, hence
it may not model the correlation accurately in some cases.
TABLE 3 Comparison of correlation parameters underlying differential privacy
Correlation
parameter
Sensitivity Advantage Challenge
푘24 푘휖 It is easy to compute.
It may introduce a large amount of
noise to the output.
휌푖푗
12 퐷푆푄 = max
푖
∑퐶푖퐿
푗=퐶푖1
휌푖푗Δ푄푗
The correlation between
record 푖 and record 푗 can be
presented clearly.
The utility of correlated dataset
depends on how well the depen-
dence coefficient is computed.
휖′ 25 Δ푓
It considers all possible
cases of data correlations.
The data correlation is not pre-
sented clearly with the correlation
parameter.
훿푖푗
11
퐶푆푞 =
max
푖∈푞
∑푛
푗=0
|훿푖푗|{‖(푄(퐷푗) −
푄(퐷−푗)‖1}
Correlated degree is able to
measure the degree of data
correlation.
Calculating correlated matrix
degree is computational comparing
with other methods.
5.5 Discussion of correlation parameters
Above methods show how to describe data correlation with correlation parameters in different settings for correlated datasets.
We can note that most these methods need more background knowledge of data generation. The background knowledge is the
number of correlated records, and it is not enough to calculate the exact correlations, leading to a higher noise level24. In12,
the background knowledge is the number of correlated records 퐿 and the probabilistic dependence relationship 푅 between the
records. However, the effectiveness of this method relies on how well the correlation between records can be modeled and
computed by the probabilistic dependence relationship. It is not easy to compute dependent coefficient accurately unless the
probabilistic models of the data is known.
When the curator has no knowledge of how the data generated, the method proposed in11 can help identify data correlation.
Comparing with the method in12, the method in11 may not have a better performance. This is because in11, the sensitivity
measures the effect on all records in the dataset according to the Pearson correlation, which may not describe data correlation
accurately as the method in12. The above analysis shows that the background knowledge of how data are generated or correlated
is essential when addressing the issue of privacy leakage on correlated data. Usually, with more background information of data
correlation, such as12,25, the correlation can be computed more precisely, leading to a better performance in terms of noise level
or data utility. In summary, the effectiveness of each method depends on the background knowledge known by the curator for
correlated datasets.
6 CORRELATIONMODELS IN DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we introduce two widely used models to describe complex data correlations: Gaussian correlation model and
Markov chain model. In the previous section, we introduce some correlation parameters to describe data correlation for simple
correlated datasets. However, it may still be difficult to measure some complex data correlations, like social network datasets
and temporal correlated datasets. In this paper, simply correlation refers to the correlation that can be described by correlation
parameters, and complex correlation refers to the correlation that is difficult to be measured by correlation parameters and
measured by correlation model.
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6.1 Gaussian correlation model
Gaussian correlation model is proposed to describe the complex data correlation and quantity the privacy loss in a new privacy
model, called Bayesian differential privacy (BDP)13. First, we give the definition of Gaussian correlation model as,
Definition 9. (Gaussian correlation model) Let 퐺(푥,푊 ) be a weighted undireted graph, where the vertex 푥푖 ∈ 푋 denotes the
record 푖 in 푋 and the weight 푤푖푗 denotes the correlation between records 푖 and 푗. Let 퐖 = (푤푖푗) be weighted adjacent matrix
which contains all weights; 퐃 = 푑푖푎푔(푤1, ...푤푛) be the diagonal matrix of 퐺(푥,푊 ) where 푤푖 =
∑
푗≠푖푤푖푗 ; 퐋 = 퐃 −퐖 be the
Laplacian matrix of 퐺(푥,푊 ),
퐋 = 퐃 −퐖 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푤1 −푤12 ⋯ −푤1,푛
−푤12 푤2 ⋯ −푤2,푛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−푤1,푛 −푤2,푛 ⋯ 푤푛
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(9)
The pair (푥,퐋) is called Gaussian correlation model, denoted as 퐺(푥,퐋). The conditional joint probability of 퐱−푖 = 퐱[푛]∖{푖}
denoted as,
푝
(
퐱−푖|푥푖) ∝ exp(−퐱T퐋퐱2
)
(10)
With Gaussian correlation model, unknown correlation between records can be described, and maximum correlated data can
be computed. Gaussian correlation model is often used with Bayesian differential privacy. Overall, the main idea of Bayesian
differential privacy is to connect the uncertain query answer with given records in a Bayesian way. The definition of Bayesian
differential privacy is given below,
Definition 10. (Bayesian Differential Privacy)13. Given an adversary = (푖,) and a randomized perturbation mechanism
(푥) = 푃푟(푟 ∈ Ω|푥) on the dataset X, Bayesian differential privacy leakage of related to is
퐵퐷푃퐿() = sup
푎,푏,푋,Ω
푙표푔
푝((푋) ∈ Ω|푋푖 = 푎,푋)
푝((푋) ∈ 푆|푋푖 = 푏,푋) (11)
where  ⊂ [푛]∖{푖} be a tuple set and (푖,) denotes the adversary with knowledge  to attack 푥푖. Then we say satisfies
휖-Bayesian differential privacy, if
sup

퐵퐷푃퐿 ≤ 휖 (12)
Bayesian differential privacy leakage shows the largest difference between 푃푟(푟 ∈ 푆|푥푖, 푥퐾 ) and 푃푟(푟 ∈ 푆|푥′푖, 푥퐾) and the
leakage is bounded by 휖. In the definition of Bayesian differential privacy, the background knowledge is 푥, rather than 푥−푖 in
the differential privacy, which means the adversary in Bayesian differential privacy is weaker than the adversary in differential
privacy. However, a weaker adversary may have a greater risk in the Bayesian differential privacy, which depends on the prior
and posterior of the data distribution.
퐁퐃퐏 퐯퐬 퐃퐏 There are two cases when Bayesian differential privacy is equivalent to differential privacy: 1) The data are
independent in the dataset and the adversary has full knowledge of the dataset except the object of its attack; and 2) The adversary
has full knowledge of the dataset except the object of its attack and the correlation between records.
Analysis: To describe data correlation in the setting of Bayesian differential privacy, Gaussian correlation model is used to
measure data correlation. Advantages of Gaussian correlation model include: 1) Any arbitrary correlation between records can
be described by a weighted network with an arbitrary topology structure; 2) Gaussian correlation model assumes that the joint
distribution of all records are Gaussian distribution. Since Gaussian distribution is easy to compute, the conditional distribution
of some records when given other records can be easy to obtain; and 3) Gaussian correlation model can describe both infinite
continuous data and discrete data. Due to these pros, Gaussian correlation model is suitable to describe data correlation in
Bayesian differential privacy, which fits the background knowledge that the adversary partially knows knowledge of individuals,
and the unknown individuals can be estimated by the Bayesian theorem.
Applications of Gaussian correlation model in BDP
Some works studied correlated data in real-world applications based on Bayesian differential privacy. For example, Gaussian
correlation model is used to describe the correlated data under the method of Bayesian differential privacy in Mobile Crowd-
Sensing (MCS)14. Mobile CrowdSensing is a new sensing paradigm that people can use personal mobile devices to collect data
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from the surrounding environment26. Data collected from some mobile applications, such as traffic monitoring and advertise-
ment delivering are from personal devices, and these information are likely to be correlated and leads to information leakage.
In14, the correlated records come from the correlated group that is divided according to the relationship among participants, and
the probabilistic relationship among sensing data records is modeled by the Gaussian correlation model. Furthermore, Gaus-
sian correlation model is used to describe the correlation structure among sensing data with different prior knowledge. Besides,
Liu et al. analyzed the issue of location privacy preserving caused by the effects of temporal and spatial correlations based on
Bayesian Geo-indistinguishability27. Another application uses Gaussian correlation model to describe data correlation in the
game theory28. Data correlation can exist in multiple datasets. To preserve privacy in multiple datasets, Wu et al. constructed a
game model of multiple players (or publishers) to preserve the data privacy by controlling the privacy parameters of publishers.
In multiple correlated datasets, the privacy of a dataset not only depends on its privacy budget, but also depends on the privacy
budget of other datasets. Gaussian correlation model is used to describe the background knowledge of the correlation between
multiple datasets.
6.2 Markov chain model
Markov chain model is a stochastic model used to describe a sequent of possible events. One feature of this model is that the
probability of each event depends only on the state attained in the previous event. Due to this, Markov chain is widely used in
modeling user mobility29,30.
AMarkov Chain contains two components: states and transitions. More precisely, 푃 = 푝1, ..., 푝푛 denote a set of states, in which
each state corresponds to a value and a current value only depends on the previous one. A set of transitions, such as 푡푖푗 denotes
the probability of moving from state 푝푖 to state 푝푗 . If an individual move from a state to an occasional position before returning
to this state, then the transition from a state to itself may occur. The sum of the probabilities in each row of the transition matrix
is 1. Here, we give an example of location data that is modeled by Markov chain.
TABLE 4 Transition matrix
푙표푐1 푙표푐1 푙표푐1
푙표푐1 0.1 0.1 0.8
푙표푐1 0.2 0.3 0.5
푙표푐1 0.6 0.6 0.2
In Table IV, the first column denotes the time point 푡, and the first row denotes the time point 푡 + 1. We can note that
푃푟(푙푡|푙푡+1) = 0.6, which means that one user is at 푙표푐3 at time point 푡, then the probability of being 푙표푐1 at time point 푡+1 is 0.6.
Application of Markov chain model
One popular application of Markov chain model is on temporal correlated datasets. When users’ locations are continuously
recorded, these records can be considered as a temporal correlated dataset. Cao et al. studied the potential privacy loss under
the temporal correlated dataset with a traditional mechanism31. The background knowledge includes the individual information
except the attacker’s object and the temporal correlation. The parameters of Markov chain can be formed into a transition matrix
to describe temporal correlation. Due to temporal correlation, temporal privacy leakage comes, and it is defined as temporal
privacy leakage.
Definition 11. (Temporal privacy leakage) Let 퐷푡

be the tuple knowledge of the adversary 퐴푖. Temporal privacy leakage of
푡 for the 퐴푖 is defined as follows.
푇푃퐿(퐴푖,
푡) = sup
푙푡
푖
,푙푡
′
푡
,푟1,...푟푇
푙표푔
푃푟(푟1, ..., 푟푇 |푙푡
푖
, 퐷푡

)
푃푟(푟1, ..., 푟푇 |푙푡′
푖
, 퐷푡

)
(13)
where퐷푡 and퐷
′
푡
are neighboring dataset. 푙푡
푖
and 푙푡
′
푖
are two different values of user 푖’s data at time 푡 and we have퐷푡 = 퐷푡

∪{푙푡
푖
}
and퐷푡
′
= 퐷푡

∪ {푙푡
′
푖
}. Temporal privacy leakage includes backward privacy leakage and forward privacy leakage. Dividing the
temporal privacy leakage in the 푟푡, then we can have backward privacy leakage and forward privacy leakage. The analysis shows
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that backward privacy leakage is likely to accumulate from previous privacy leakage and forward privacy leakage increases with
future release.
Another work about temporal correlation is related to the location privacy. The background knowledge of data correlation is
also modeled through the Markov chain and the neighboring dataset and sensitivity are redefined to fit the applicable problem16.
Let 푝−
푡
be the prior probability of a user’s location at time 푡. 훿-location set is a set of minimum number of possible locations that
the sum of prior probabilities is no more than 1 − 훿, and the equation is given below.
Δ푋푡 = 푚푖푛{푠푖|∑
푠푖
푝−
푡
[푖] ≤ 1 − 훿} (14)
The goal of 훿-location set is used to form a dataset that reflects a set of probable locations the user might appear, which is
equivalent to the dataset of outputs in differential privacy. We can note that the difference from traditional differential privacy
lies in the neighboring dataset. The neighboring dataset in the new definition is any possible location 푥1 and 푥2 in the 훿-location
set. This definition states the output of location 푧푡 is differentially private at time 푡 for continual released locations under temporal
correlations. Moreover, due to the modification of neighboring dataset, two dimensional space turns into multidimensional
space. Based on the notion of convex hull, the sensitivity hull is proposed to capture the geometric meaning of sensitivity.
TABLE 5 Comparison of correlation models underlying differential privacy
Correlation
model
Direction Circulation Applied situation
Gaussian
correlation
model
Directed
graph
Acyclic
It can describe induced cor-
relation.
Markov
correlation
model
Undirected
graph
Cyclic
There is no direction for data
correlation and can repre-
sent cyclic dependencies.
6.3 Discussion of correlation models
The advantage of correlation model is that it can model complex data correlation and can be used to express in the form of
the posterior probabilities with other background knowledge expressed in the form of prior probabilities. The comparison of
correlation models is in the Table V. The experiments14 shows the proposed perturbation mechanism based on Bayeisan differ-
ential privacy introduces less noise to the query results of correlated sensing data, comparing with Zhu’s scheme11 and Chen’s
scheme10. For simple data correlation, adopting correlation parameters to model data correlation is easy to compute and to pro-
tect data privacy with a high utility of data. For example, the background knowledge of correlation is described by dependent
coefficient12 and by correlated degree matrix11. For complex data correlation, Gaussian correlation model and Markov correla-
tionmodel are considered as powerful methods to describe complex correlated dataset. For temporal correlated datasets, Markov
chain model is a suitable method to present data correlation and guarantee the data privacy. Due to the advantage of correlation
model, more and more works tend to adopt it to describe the correlated dataset. However, the best choice of correlation model
depends on the specific type of correlations.
7 THE FRAMEWORK OF PUFFERFISH
In this section, we first introduce Pufferfish and its variant, and then give mechanisms for Pufferfish. Pufferfish is a privacy
framework that is proposed to cope with the issue of privacy leakage in correlated data. Kifer and Machanavajjhala confirmed
that correlated data is likely to leak more unexpected privacy8 under differential privacy. In order to break the limitations
of correlated differential privacy, they proposed a new privacy model called Pufferfish which can provide different privacy
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definitions to the needs of customized applications. Pufferfish is quite different from differential privacy, and this privacy model
includes the protected target, background knowledge of the adversary and the neighboring dataset.
7.1 Pufferfish
In Pufferfish, three components are used to specify the privacy requirements:  , a set of secrets that are needed to be protected;
푝푎푖푟푠, a set of secret pairs that need to be indistinguishable to the adversary; Θ, a class of distributions that represents how the
data are generated. The definition of Pufferfish is described as follows.
Definition 12. (휖-Pufferfish)9. A privacy mechanism satisfies 휖-Pufferfish in a framework ( ,,Θ) if for datasets 푋 ∼ 휃
and for all secret pairs(푠푖, 푠푗) ∈ 푝푎푖푟푠 and for all possible output 휔 ∈ Ω,
푒−휖 ⋅
푃 (푠푖|휃)
푝(푠푗|휃) ≤
푃 (푠푖|(푋) = 푤, 휃)
푃 (푠푗 |(푋) = 푤, 휃) ≤ 푒−휖 ⋅
푃 (푠푖|휃)
푝(푠푗|휃) (15)
where 휃 (휃 ∈ Θ) is to represent a probability distribution which denotes the attacker’s probabilistic belief and background
knowledge. 푃 (푠푖|휃) and 푃 (푠푗|휃) are conditional probabilities and the attacker has uncertainly about 푠푖 and 푠푗 (푃 (푠푖|휃) ≠ 0,
푃 (푠푗|휃) ≠ 0). When the 휖 is small, seeing the sanitized output 푤 leaks nearly no information to the attacker who is trying to
figure out whether 푠푖 or 푠푗 is true.
There are two advantages of why Pufferfish privacy framework is able to deal with correlated data: (1) Pufferfish is able to
hide private information against data correlation in the dataset since data correlation is assumed to be specified. (2) Pufferfish
is capable of dealing with a large number of correlated records, and it can provide a high utility of data. This is because the
sensitive information is specified, and various discriminative pairs can be used to protect the sensitive information.
퐏퐮퐟퐟퐞퐫퐟퐢퐬퐡 퐯퐬 퐃퐏 Three main differences are between Pufferfish and differential privacy. (1) The information that we want
to protect in Pufferfish is specified and can be various information, while the information we want to protect in differential
privacy is whether one user (or record) is in the dataset in the 휖-DP. (2) The discriminative pairs can be various in Pufferfish,
while the discriminative pair can be regarded as "one record is in the dataset" and "one record is not in the dataset" in 휖-DP. (3)
Assumptions are made in data generation in Pufferfish, while data are assumed to be independent in differential privacy. When
satisfying some conditions, differential privacy can be regarded as a special case of Pufferfish. Hence, Pufferfish is a kind of
generalization of differential privacy, which provides rigorous statistical guarantee to prevent the information leakage.
퐁퐃퐏 퐯퐬 퐏퐮퐟퐟퐞퐫퐟 퐢퐬퐡 Bayesian differential privacy can be considered as a special case of Pufferfish. When the potential secrets
to be the set of all possible values of records in the dataset and discriminative pairs to be the corresponding set of all pairs of
secrets, and data are generated by the Bayesian network, and then Pufferfish transforms into Bayesian differential privacy.
7.2 Blowfish
Based on the framework of Pufferfish, another privacy model Blowfish privacy is proposed to provide a rich interface for
implementation17. The key feature of Blowfish is a policy that the sensitive information is specified, and adversary knowledge is
in the form of a set of deterministic constraints푄 that are known by the public. With these policies, mechanisms can be expected
to permit more utility since not all properties of an individual need to be kept secret and adversarial attacks on correlated records
can be limited due to public known constraints. The definition of Blowfish is given below.
Definition 13. ((휖, 푃 ) Blowfish) Given a privacy budget 휖 and a policy 푃 ( ,,), a randomized mechanism  satisfies
(휖, 푃 )-Blowfish privacy if for any pairs of neighboring datasets 퐷, 퐷′ and for all possible outputs 휔 ⊂ Ω, we have
푃푟[(퐷 ∈ Ω) ≤ 푒휖푃푟[(퐷′ ∈ Ω)] (16)
Here, the policy 푃 ( ,,) is a new notion proposed in Blowfish. For a policy 푃 ( ,,),  is the domain of the dataset;
 = (푉 , 퐸) is a discriminative graph used to present the secret pairs, in which 푉 ⊂  and 퐸 ⊂  ∗  denotes values in the
domain that an adversary must not distinguish between them;  denoting the set of datasets that are possible under the publicly
known constraints 푄.
퐁퐥퐨퐰퐟퐢퐬퐡 퐯퐬 퐏퐮퐟퐟퐞퐫퐟 퐢퐬퐡 Blowfish borrows the notion of a set of specified secrets that need protection from Pufferfish. In
Pufferfish, the adversary knowledge is defined as the assumption about how data are generated, and it tends to be described by
the probabilistic correlation function. In Blowfish, the knowledge of correlation is defined as a set of publicly known constraints.
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This indicates that Blowfish without constraints is equivalent to Pufferfish in the case of adversaries who believe records in the
dataset are independent. Both Pufferfish and Blowfish are helpful for the data publisher who can customize privacy definitions
by carefully defining sensitive information and background knowledge.
퐁퐥퐨퐰퐟퐢퐬퐡 퐯퐬 퐃퐏 Differential privacy can be considered as a special case of Blowfish when two conditions are satisfied: (1)
The second parameter of the policy  is the complete graph on the domain, instead of a part of the domain. (2) There is no
publicly known constrains on the dataset.
7.3 Mechanisms for Pufferfish
7.3.1 The Wasserstein mechanism
Every privacy model needs corresponding mechanisms to perform. Some mechanisms proposed are proposed to implement
Pufferfish. Since there is no general mechanism for the framework of Pufferfish, Wang and Song firstly proposed general mech-
anisms that can apply in the Pufferfish32,33. They used the Wasserstein distance as a metric to measure the maximum distance
between distributions 푃 ((푋)|푠푗 , 휃) and 푃 ((푋)|푠푖, 휃) for a secret pair (푠푖, 푠푗). Here, the maximum distance for a secret pair
is similar to the maximal difference between the query result on neighboring datasets in differential privacy. Hence, the goal of
the Wasserstein mechanism is to measure the maximum distance for a secret pair. The definition of maximum distance is given
below.
Definition 14. (∞-Wasserstein distance) Suppose for some (푠푖, 푠푗) and 휃, 푃 (푓 (푋)|푠푖, 휃) can be transformed into 푃 (푓 (푋)|푠푗 , 휃).
Then the maximum distance of two probability mass function is Wassertein distance which is given as
푊푖,푗,휃 = 푊∞(푃 (푓 (푥)|푠푖, 휃), 푃 (푓 (푥)|푠푗 , 휃)) (17)
where 푓 is the query.
Adding Laplace noise with the scale of 푊푖,푗,휃 to the query answers will guarantee the odds ratio of 푠푖 to 푠푗 in the range of
[푒−휖, 푒휖]. The odds ratio of 푠푖 to 푠푗 is the probability of 푠푖 being 푠푗 after the attacker seeing the sanitized output. After iterating
all pairs (푠푖, 푠푗) ∈  and all 휃 ∈ Θ, the maximum Wassertein distance can be obtained. In Wassertein mechanism, the amount
of noise added to the correlated dataset is similar to the form in Laplace mechanism,
푍 = 퐿푎푝(
푊
휖
) (18)
where푊 = 푠푢푝(푠푖,푠푗 )∈,휃∈Θ푊∞(푢푖,휃 , 푢푗,휃).
7.3.2 The Markov Quilt mechanism
AsWassertein mechanism may have a complex computation, another mechanism called the Markov Quilt mechanism, based on
Bayesian network is proposed for Pufferfish. As we mentioned in Section VI, Bayesian network is a popular method to describe
data correlation. Hence, there is also a mechanism which uses Bayesian network to design mechanism in Pufferfish.
The mechanism will attempt to find a proper set 푋퐴 such that 푋푖 has low max-influence on 푋퐴 under Θ. Here, 푋퐴 can be
regarded as a set of nodes that have correlation with푋푖. First, we need to quantify the extent of changing the value of a variable
푋푖 ∈ 푋 can affect a set of nodes 푋퐴 ∈ 푋. The maximum influence of the variable 푋푖 on a set of variables푋퐴 is defined as
푒(푋퐴|푋푖) = max
푎,푏∈푋
sup
휃∈Θ푥퐴∈푋
푙표푔
푃 (푋퐴 = 푥퐴|푋푖 = 푎, 휃)
푃 (푋퐴 = 푥퐴|푋푖 = 푏, 휃) (19)
Hence, the maximum influence is the maximum divergence between distributions 푃 ((푋퐴 = 푥퐴|푋푖 = 푎, 휃)) and 푃 ((푋퐴 =
푥퐴|푋푖 = 푏, 휃)). In order to find the set 푋퐴 efficiently, Markov Quilt is proposed to find the set and the definition is given below.
Definition 15. (Markov Quilt) A set of nodes 푋푄 is Markov Quilt set for a node 푋푖 if the following conditions are satisfied in
the Bayesian network 퐺 = (푋,퐸). (1) Deleting the 푋퐺 can separate 퐺 into two sets 푋푁 and푋푅 and thus푋 = 푋푁 ∪푋푅 ∪푋푄
and 푋푖 ∈ 푋푁 . (2) 푋푅 is independent of 푋푖 conditioned on 푋푄.
The main insight behind the Markov Quilt mechanism is that if 푋푖 and 푋푗 are distant from each other, then 푋푗 is largely
independent of 푋푖. Thus, adding noise to the local nodes can obscure the effect of 푋푖 in the query result. Using Markov Quilt,
it is efficient to find 푋푅 which is a set of remote nodes far from 푋푖 and 푋푁 which is a set of local nodes near 푋푖.
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7.4 Discussion of Pufferfish
The drawback of differential privacy is that it is not enough to erase the participation of a single individual’s private value when
there are multiple records correlated with each other. Hence, another privacy model, Pufferfish is proposed to cope with the
issue of privacy loss on correlated data. The key of Pufferfish is that it considers how the data are generated and the knowledge
of potential attackers. Inspired by Pufferfish, more privacy models study the privacy leakage with the consideration of the
background knowledge of data generation. Also, increasing mechanisms for Pufferfish are proposed for the application of this
privacy model.
8 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we will introduce some promising future directions on correlated differential privacy. In the section V-VII, we
summarize most works on correlated data under different privacy models. Three lines include: 1) describing data correlation
with correlation parameters, and 2) using correlationmodels to describe complex data correlation under the setting of differential
privacy, and 3) using the framework of Pufferfish to measure data correlation. However, there are still some issues on correlated
data that have not been considered yet.
8.1 Correlated differential privacy in machine learning
Differential privacy is privacy model also used in artificial intelligence to prevent data leakage34,35, especially in machine
learning36,37. Chaudhuri et al. provided an output perturbation38 and objective perturbation mechanism39. Abadi et al. studied
differentially private stochastic gradient descent mechanisms, where noise is added to gradients40. However, data correlation
has not been considered when adding noise during the learning. Data correlation in the training data is likely to lead to more
changes on the training result, and consequently the adversary is able to obtain more information. So far, Zhang et al. have
proposed a feature selection method to reduce data correlation in the training dataset41. Privacy loss due to data correlation in
machine learning still have some open issues, such as quantifying the privacy loss due to data correlation.
8.2 Multiple correlated relationships
Real-world datasets are likely to be multiple relationships between records. As the example illustrated in the Section IV, two
types of relationships can be in the location dataset, such as the user mobility pattern and the social relationship. In previous
studies, researches assumed that only one correlation is in the dataset, which is not practical. One intuitive way to cope with
multiple correlations in the dataset is to treat different kinds of correlations as the same correlation. And then methods illustrated
in Section V-VII can be used to deal with the correlated records and protect privacy leakage. Obviously, it is not an optimal
solution because the number of correlated records are enlarged and more noise will be added to the dataset. Hence, the utility of
datasets will not be desirable. Themethod to model multiple correlated relationships and themechanism to guarantee differential
privacy under multiple correlations are open issues that need to be explored in the future.
8.3 Correlations in different datasets
Currently, most research focuses on the issue of correlated data in a dataset, while correlated data can be distributed in different
datasets. The sensitive information may be leaked when multiple entities publish their data sequentially. If the adversary has
enough background information of the dataset, the privacy level of these datasets will be degraded especially when records are
correlated in different datasets. The privacy level of datasets not only depends on its privacy parameter, but also depends on the
privacy parameter of its neighboring datasets. Most studies may be not applicable when correlated data are in different datasets,
like the framework of Pufferfish. This is because there are multiple entities, and they need to negotiate with each other and then
make the best choices according to each publisher’s privacy request and the utility of whole datasets. Wu. et al constructed a
game model of multiple players and study the uniqueness of pure Nash Equilibrium28. However, there are still many issues that
need to be considered, like the weight of each publisher and each publisher’s own privacy requirement. One promising method
of this issue can be modeled as a multi-agent systems to achieve the optimal data utility for multiple data entities.
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8.4 Continuous query release
When a dataset deals with a large number of queries, data privacy is more vulnerable since the adversary may infer more
information via multiple queries. This will leak more information, especially when the records in the dataset are not independent.
Zhu et al. studied the continuous query release for the correlated dataset42. An iterative-based mechanism43 is adopted to answer
a set of queries on the correlated datasets. During the process of continuous queries, when a query finds an obvious difference
between the current dataset and true dataset, the mechanism will have an update on the current dataset in next query. Continual
query release is a difficult topic in privacy preserving, especially for correlated dataset. There are still many unsolved problems.
e.g., how to deal with various types of statistical queries, and how to incorporate with multiple correlations for continuous query
release.
8.5 Inference attacks on correlated data
As we mentioned, data correlation in datasets can leak more information than expected when using differential privacy. This
makes inference attacks more easier on correlated datasets. Even though strong protection provided by differential privacy
obfuscates the original data using stochastic noise to avoid privacy leakage, privacy leakage is still breached by some inference
attacks. Shao et al. proposed a novel location inference attack framework, which is able to recover multiple trajectories from
differentially private trajectory data using the structured sparsity model44. In the future, more and more attacks are aiming on
correlated differential privacy, and how to defend these attacks is a challenging topic.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper presents a survey on correlated data under different privacy models. Since correlated dataset are expected to leak
more privacy than expected, many works focus on how to address with this issue. Basically, these research are mainly classified
into three streams: the first focuses on how to use parameters to describe the correlation in differential privacy; the second uses
correlation models to describe data correlation in differential privacy; the last method is a new privacy model, called Pufferfish
to protect data privacy while keeps a good utility of datasets. In the first two lines, we analyze different correlation parameters
and correlationmodels of how to describe data correlation, and compare cons and pros of these methods. Simple data correlation
can be described by correlation parameters, and complex data correlation can be described by correlation models. In the last
research line, we analyze Pufferfish, compare the difference of this model with differential privacy, and present mechanisms
for Pufferfish. Our goal is to provide an overview of existing work on the issue of correlated dataset. Lastly, we propose some
interesting issues that have not been studied or solved in correlated differential privacy.
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